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SUMMARY

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GENERAL

1.	Brazil	may	introduce	resolution	on Korea:

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The Brazilian delegate to the United Nations has drafted a resolution on Korea which he believes would counteract any Soviet cease-fire proposal. This is a reversal of his earlier stand against any new resolution.

The draft notes the Communist rejection of the Indian resolution, calls on member states for full support of the UN effort, and proclaims UN willingness to convene special sessions as required by the Korea situation.

Comment: At a 19 February meeting of UN members supplying troops for Korea, it was agreed that the United States would draft a resolution reaffirming the General Assembly stand on the Indian proposal. It was further decided to hold this resolution in reserve, awaiting Soviet action.

This Brazilian tactic is likely to attract considerable support from other Latin American delegations.

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25X1A Approved For Release 2004/01/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A001000490001-6 25X1 SOUTHEAST ASIA Burma will place Chinese Nationalist issue before UN: The Burmese Foreign Minister has informed 25X1A the American Ambassador in Rangoon that his government has decided to place the Chinese Nationalist issue before the United Nations. A statement to this effect, a copy of which is being given to the Chinese Communist Ambassador, will be made to parliament by the Prime Minister on 2 March. 25X² Previous plans to submit the case to the UN

were not carried through because of lack of sufficient evidence as to the sources of Nationalist supplies, reluctance to admit Burma's inability to suppress the Chinese intruders, and fear that relations with friendly countries would be adversely affected,

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6. Comment on the Iranian situation:

The crisis brought about by the Shah's decision on 28 February to remain in Iran has resulted in a struggle between Prime Minister Mossadeq and an anti-Mossadeq coalition of army, Court and religious leaders, headed by the fanatical religious mullah and Majlis President Ayatollah Kashani.

the army strongly supports the Shah, who made his decision after secular and religious leaders urged him to stay and after crowds demonstrated outside the palace. Although order has been restored for the time being, supporters of Kashani and of retired General Zahedi, often mentioned as a possible successor to Mossadeq, are active.

Nevertheless, the Prime Minister has in the past retained control of the government through superior initiative. Despite his failure to sway the Majlis on the evening of 28 February, he has reportedly announced that he would ask for a vote of confidence and has asserted that if his position is not clarified within 48 hours he will appeal directly to the people. The Majlis is currently considering a bill introduced by his supporters proclaiming its loyalty to the Shah but its support for the Prime Minister. On 1 March the Tudeh reportedly came out in support of Mossadeq.

The Prime Minister's position is more precarious than at any time since he came to power in 1951, but the Shah's vacillating nature and conflicting interests of the opposition favor Mossadeq.

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